Food security in transition
Policy makers as well as many academics have, somewhat belatedly, finally accepted that UK food security constitutes one of the five ‘grand Challenges’ for the international research community. This dilatoriness may initially appear rather surprising given that historically Britain more than any other European country depended on sourcing much of its food from overseas including its colonies. Food security is not simply about the extent to which the country is able to supply its own food requirements but also encompasses the need to ensure a diversity of supply sources. This entails avoiding excessive dependence on a single supplier as well as a high degree of sustainability in respect of the way agricultural commodities are produced and supplied to consumers. How far Britain has coped with ensuring food security in the past and these might provide lessons for present policy is the focal point of this study.
Food security during the industrial revolution
During the industrial revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries agriculture played a critical role in the country’s transformation. This was evident not only in terms of exponential increase in the amount of food grown but also more importantly the more efficient way it was produced. The traditional communal system of open field farming is being replaced by enclosed fields and the bringing into cultivation through appropriation of the common fields and the surrounding waste land. The reorganization of land tenure which reinforced the concept of private property under the jurisdiction of individual farmers enabled the adoption of more productive. methods in particular crop rotations, this popularized the cultivation of turnips, and improved strains of rye grasses and legumes which enhanced livestock nutrition and in turn production.
Britain was not necessarily self-sufficient in food, having, for example, imported food from the rest of Europe including the colonies. The latter were particularly important given the mercantilist-based trade based on which European powers, primarily Britain, exploited colonies for raw materials (tobacco, sugar, timber) while enforcing the purchase of manufactured goods from the mother country. Such regulations had a profound impact on the country’s dietary habits. By the late eighteenth-century Britain accounted for nearly half the sugar reaching Europe, with consumption levels per person being over 10 times higher than those in the rest of Europe. Such a system prompted the development of a monocultural export orientated economy based on slavery in its colonies.
The French and Napoleonic wars (1793-1815) disrupted trading relationships and particularly the ability to import food. The Continental System entailing a large-scale embargo by French emperor Napoloen1 against the British Empire resulted in an unprecedented increase in food prices. In turn this speeded up the rate at which enclosures and the appropriation of common land was taking place.
The expansion of arable farming is pioneered mainly by the more progressive larger farmers motivated by economic considerations at the expense of their smaller proprietors. The latter being unable to afford the administrative costs of this process which included fencing their newly acquired land holdings. This forced the rapidly increasing rural population, much of which was now surplus to the needs of agriculture, to become impoverished landless laborers or to migrate to industrial centers in seeking employment.
Food price inflation in Britain during the wars with France pales into insignificance in contrast to that endured by peasants in France and the economic retardation which ensured. Britain’s ability to successfully navigate the wartime food crisis, aided by the produce of its colonies, enabled the country to become the world’s leading industrial nation by the early decades of the 19th century. The resumption of peace in 1815 prompted the ruling landowning classes to believe that this might lead to a collapse in agricultural prices. and in turn the rents they received from their tenant farmers. Their response was the introduction of the Corn Laws in 1815. The legislation being specifically intended to favour domestic producers by imposing tariffs and restrictions on imported cereals. It paid scant attention to that of ensuring a coherent food security policy.
Mid-Victorian prosperity
Britain’s industrial dominance in the mid-Victorian period was also accompanied by a transformation of farming which to cite agricultural historian Professor F.M.L Thompson constituted a ‘second agricultural revolution.’ The changes which took place were in effect the transition from what was an essentially organic system of farming to a system which depended on the increased use of resources which originated outside the agricultural sector. These included the importation of new sources of fertilizer such as guano from Peru and the use of protein rich oil-seed cakes (a by product which remained following the extraction of the oil from imported seeds such as linseed and cotton,) these being fed to cattle in order to produce a nutrient rich source of manure to enhance crop yields.
Britain’s shift in favor of a system of free trade further encouraged imports of agricultural produce and raw materials. Rather surprisingly, the issue of food security, in terms of how the nation would be able to cope in the event of another conflict, merited scant attention.
Following the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 agricultural prosperity depended on the fact that there was yet no large world surplus of low-priced cereals and meat which could readily and cheaply be transported to Britain. The repeal led to the adoption of ‘high farming’, which was aptly described as ‘higher inputs to offset relatively falling grain prices’ and, more particularly, as ‘high feeding’ larger inputs of root and fodder crops supplemented by feeding animals the residue obtained after the oil had been extracted from various imported oilseeds.
This prosperity for the land-owning classes and their tenant farmers rapidly eclipsed following the overseas development of the railway network and the improvements in transatlantic shipping. These transport changes enabled Britain to become the hub of an international trading network in which agricultural produce could be imported in ever increasing quantities. Scant attention is being directed to the environmental and social effects of the way agricultural commodities were produced.
The development of overseas competition
The rapid expansion of overseas competition from the late nineteenth century onwards reflected Britain’s commitment to a system of free trade. This facilitated encouraged imports of agricultural produce and raw materials in return for allowing unfettered access to overseas markets for manufactured and industrial products. Grain was increasingly imported from the prairies of the United States and Canada where monoculture and degradation of the soil prevailed. From 1870 up to the outbreak of the First World War Britain accounted for about half of the wheat and flour exported from the United States and in some years as much as two thirds. Concerns about food security and the disproportionate dependence on overseas supplies attracted little concern from the ruling groups in Britain who were increasingly dominated by the interests of the commercial and business classes.
In the case of sugar where Britain continued to depend on imports not only from its colonies but increasingly from Germany which became a major supplier of sugar. By 1900 nearly 50 per cent of Britain’s sugar imports originated from Germany and to a lesser extent from Austria-Hungary. The ready availability of sugar which could be cheaply transported to Britain retarded the development of Britain developing its own sugar beet industry.
The country was pursuing a uniquely ‘British ‘pattern of development combining free trade, with the colonies being tasked with supplying cheap raw materials to supply the industrialized core. Colonial economies were linked and deemed sub servant to British interests This a period when the Ricardian model of comparative advantage was not only practiced but an integral part of what was perceived as the British system. The prevailing assumption being that cheap imported food would continue to be readily and indefinitely available.
World War One
Initially the threat to food security posed by the First World War did little to engender a more proactive response by the British government to food security. This reluctance reflected the prevailing confidence in the protection afforded by the newly developed Dreadnought battleships. These were considerably larger and faster than their predecessors being equipped with large-caliber superior guns in comparison with those of their competitors. Along with Britain’s imposing merchant fleet, its extensive network of strategically located coaling stations and the multiplicity of alternative shipping routes it was assumed, rather naively that a blockade would be virtually impossible. This assumption proved ill founded. By the spring of 1915 the liberal administration was faced with significantly higher prices and shortages of staple foods such as wheat, meat and sugar. The government, being eventually forced to implement what was a hoc system of price controls, government purchases and rationing extended control over national dietary practice.
It was not until the accession of Lloyd George to the premiership in December 1916 that an effort was made to implement a more comprehensive and coherent plan to increase domestic food production. The German blockade eventually forced the British government to implement a food production campaign specifically designed to encourage the expansion of arable farming. The main initiative was the implementation of the Corn Production Act 1917 which provided guaranteed prices for wheat and oats. County based committees were directed to persuade, and later cajole, farmers to embark upon a ploughing campaign to increase the production of arable crops. The 1.5-million-acre wartime increase in the area of arable land, however, proved to be a belated and short-lived upturn in the fortunes of arable farmers.
Despite Britain’s rather limited wartime efforts to increase to increase domestic food production the country was fortunate enough to emerge on the winning side in the conflict. To a large extent, being able to feed its population reflected the country’s continued ability to be able to import sufficient food during the conflict. As such Britain was able to avoid the morale sapping food shortages which Germany and Russia were forced to endure. In the case of the former, traumatized by starvation, the turnip winter of 1917 revealed the precarious dependence on it own food supplies. In Russia the food shortages were an important underlying cause of the landmark 1917 revolution.
Following the return of peace and resumption of pre-war trading relationships, agricultural prices on the international markets collapsed. As a result, the guaranteed price legislation was rapidly repealed leading to once more large tracts of arable land reverting back to pasture or even left to become derelict. Britain became even more dependent on overseas supplies than it had been prior to the outbreak of the First World War. Food imports were largely uncoordinated and subject to minimal official controls. By 1931 Britain had become largest single free trade area for agricultural produce in the world. It was only the fear that the country might become the dumping ground for the world surpluses that the British government finally and somewhat reluctantly abandoned its commitment to free trade.
Food security during the Second World War
It was the growing threat of military conflict, with its potential impact on the country’s ability to import food that brought the issue of food security back into sharp focus. Ensuring that the population was adequately fed was now even more of a challenge than during the First World War. This reflected the country’s even higher dependence on imported food and the potential imposition of an even more effective trade embargo. In 1938, 70 per cent of the cash value of the food consumed in Britain originated from overseas, which equated to 23 million tons of shipping space for food, fodder and fertilizer. No other European county was anywhere as near reliant on food imports as this, its nearest rival being that of Switzerland, whose food imports amounted to 35 per cent of its total food consumption. As a result, Britain was importing food from literally all corners of the world. There were unprecedented efforts to increase arable production by encouraging and directing farmers to plough up pastureland. The area of cultivated land increased by 66 per cent between 1939 and 1944. Within the space of a mere five years the area of arable land in England and Wales had increased from less than 12 million acres to over 16 million – a transformation unparalleled in the annals of agrarian history. However, the wartime ploughing up campaign also often resulted in the conversion of ecologically diverse pasture and wildflower meadows.
According to the official history compiled by K.A.H. Murray (1954), the wartime food production campaign constituted an unqualified success story, which went far beyond the estimates of pre-war planners. Compared with pre-war production, by 1944 there had been 90 per cent increase in wheat, 87 per cent increase in potatoes, 45 per cent increase in vegetables and 19 per cent increase in sugar beet.
Challenges
The challenges which Britain faced with respect of ensuring food security were not only significantly greater in terms of magnitude, but completely different from those facing other countries which were embroiled in the world’s greatest conflict. Britain, for example, was heavily dependent on importing hard grained wheat which was essential for making the type of white bread the population were accustomed to. To ensure that the country could cope with an impending blockade the Ministry of Food took steps to ensure a more equitable distribution via the imposition of rationing controls of staple foods including meat, sugar, and butter. The Ministry became the sole purchaser of most agricultural commodities and exercised price controls over virtually all products. Nearly 90 per cent of the wheat Britain used for breadmaking was imported mainly from the USA, Canada and Australia. American supplies were crucial and wheat control was prioritized. Port grain committees were established to coordinate and direct the supply of imported wheat to the millers. To rationalize bread making slicing and wrapping were prohibited. Initial efforts to maintain the extraction rates of 73-76 per cent were undermined by shipping losses and in April 1942 the 85 per cent ‘National Loaf’, a bran style, was introduced.
In the case of sugar, an integral and peculiarly Anglo Saxon cheap dietary component which yielded considerably more energy than if the same amount of money was spent on bread. Some of the country’s requirements were supplied by cane grown in colonies often on a monocultural system. This was not only environmentally demanding but often resulted in deforestation and soil erosion. As Imports from Germany were no longer possible Efforts to increase sugar production from domestically grown sugar beet were limited in terms of extent to which production increased and as a result necessitated strict controls in terms of allocation of available supplies.
More than half of Britain’s meat was imported from as far field as Australia and New Zealand while 90 per cent of the nation’s butter originated from overseas. To control the distribution of meat the government control slaughterhouses, reducing the number from a prewar figure of more than 16000 to 779 by 1942.
The Ministry of Food introduced a comprehensive system of food rationing an effort to ensure a more equitable distribution of available supplies. In the case of meat for example shortages were addressed by prompting dietary diversification. Horse meat and rabbit consumption increase along with promoting the seasonal consumption of young rooks in pies. The Ministry also made strenuous effort through press accounts to encourage the increased consumption of staple foods such as potatoes and carrots which were readily available. ‘Potato Pete’ was a cartoon character from the WW2 era, whose job was to persuade people to fill up on homegrown potatoes. rather than bread made from imported wheat. Potatoes were made into all kinds of recipes during the war, replacing some of the fat in pastry and even turning into dessert. Doctor Carrot, a bespectacled vegetable toting a top hat and a briefcase containing vitamin A, was especially popular, appearing in newspaper advertisements and posters. Collectively these wartime initiatives ensured that the country was not starved into submission which constitute the emergence of Britain’s first coherent food security program.
Post war
Following the end of miliary hostilities in 1945, it was deemed imperative, based on wartime precedent and Britain’s precarious financial position that state support for agriculture needed to be continued. The agricultural policy pursued by the newly elected Labour government reflected a redefinition of Party ideology. Its approach was that of private enterprise, sponsored rather than directed by the state through that of assured markets and guaranteed prices. Putting aside its long-cherished historical commitment to land nationalization, the Labour administration perceived its role as managing the capitalist economy rather than engineering its transformation into a socialist one. Insulating the agricultural sector from the vagaries of volatile overseas agricultural markets was high on its agenda.
The need for such an approach was also influenced by pragmatic considerations in the form of international food shortages and high prices. The wartime disruption to European farming meant that by 1947 world food production was four per cent below its pre-war levels. This was compounded by Britain’s financially precarious position although having emerged from the war on the winning side it was in effect virtually bankrupt. This was affirmed in 1946 as the most dramatic matter by the decision to introduce bread rationing a policy which the Churchill’s wartime coalition had shrunk from and had last been used in 1802.
As part of the post-war plans for radical reform, the government introduced the 1947 Agriculture Act, a comprehensive plan for a ‘stable and efficient agricultural industry.’ Its objective was to promote the provision of guaranteed prices and ensure markets increase output. The legislation committed the government to an annual price review for wheat, oats, barley, rye, potatoes, sugar beet, cattle, sheep, milk, eggs, and wool products, which accounted for an estimated 80 per cent of gross agricultural output. The price review, undertaken annually intended to ensure that prices could be realigned with increases in the cost of production. The annual review being undertaken consultation with representatives of producers in the agricultural industry, namely the National Farmers Union, favoured producers at the expense of the consumers. Yet it was not quite as generous as it might appear, and farmers were still expected to make efficient and productivity improvements in the way they farmed. This framework of government support, in rewarded farmers for food they produced as opposed to the ecological and environmental impact of the way the land was managed.
Agricultural productivism
Between 1945 and 1965 the volume of agricultural output increased on average by 2.8 per cent each year. By the early 1970s yields of arable crops had increased virtually threefold, allied to significant corresponding increases in livestock productivity.
During the immediate post war period British agricultural output trebled and self-sufficiency rising from 40 to 60 percent between 1954 and 1973, and near doubling of total factor productivity from the 1950s to the 1990s. The remarkable increase in agricultural output and more importantly productivity which took place reflected not only the development of more productive scientific methods of farming, and more importantly their more widespread assimilation by the farming community. A key factor in disseminating these more productive scientific methods of farming was the network of agricultural advisers employed by the new National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAAS, renamed ADAS in 1971) complemented by the role of leading commercial companies such as ICI.
Future policy implications
An historical review of food security indicates that despite being more dependent on imported food than other European countries, Britain successfully managed to navigate these challenges. This has almost invariably contributed to a degree of complacency in that interest in ensuring food security both in the past and plans have not merited the attention they deserve. It is rather naïve to assume previous approaches will necessarily ensure that the country will invariably ensure a similar outcome. The threats posed by climate change, global uncertainties, changes in dietary habits as well as increasing standards of living may mean that achieving even the present level of food security will be difficult to achieve in the foreseeable future. There are ominous signs that challenges in the future will be more problematic than in the past. In the 1980s, British farmers produced approximately 78% of the food we consumed. Today, that figure has fallen to just 62%. Since the 1980s, British farming has faced an undeniable decline. By 2023, the number of farm holdings had decreased to around 209,000, reflecting trends driven by urbanization, economic pressure, and technological change.
This leads us to an important question: how can we engender greater interest in food security and how can we develop resilience to cope with future challenges. In effect to prepare for more frequent climate shocks and to develop robust strategies to adapt how they manage land, livestock and resources in order stay resilient. The history of food security in Britain reveals the relying as in the past on ad hoc short pragmatic responses relies on food fortune and serendipity.
It seems imperative that the government and future administrations should commit to being more proactive. This leads us to an important question: how can we engender greater interest in food security and how can we develop resilience to cope with future challenges. new more radical and proactive approach to prompting interest in food security and understanding our agricultural heritage is merited. A revival in the wartime role of the Ministry of Food is merited. While the imposition of the food rationing would be anathema, there is considerable scope for the authorities to resurrect the wartime plans to encourage the population to realign their eating habits in accordance with the kind and variety of foods which are readily available. This could be complemented with advertising schemes and appeals to prompt eating foods which are available on a seasonal basis. The government should instigate the establishment of legally binding targets to increase the proportion of food produced at home to ensure that the country becomes less dependent on imported food. Secondly, it would be opportune to enhance better understanding and appreciation of in of the way previous administrations, farmers and consumers have historically dealt with threats to food security. In effect, it is important that the Government understands that UK’s success, in large part thanks to serendipity as opposed to foresight in dealing with them in previous eras ‘muddling through’ and ‘hoping for the best’ as with previous challenges is not a viable or effective response. With extreme weather now becoming the new normal, the government should encourage farmers via financial incentives to become more proactive and prepare for what is an uncertain future. Thirdly, the need to build resilience among farmers, I think that the most profitable farms and those most likely to be able cope in the future all have one thing in common: attention to detail. coupled with meticulous planning. Developing initiatives along these lines will enable the country to achieve a comprehensive and robust system of food security, The lesson from history is that previous instances of food crisis have for the most part depended on good fortune and serendipity as opposed to comprehensive forward planning.
