A new Cold War?
Scholars, journalists, and politicians have compared the current transformation of the international order to past eras, thereby discussing differences and similarities, and making policy recommendations on how to deal with today’s geopolitical challenges. With the growth of Sino-American rivalry and Russia pursuing an increasingly aggressive foreign policy, many commentators have described the emerging geopolitical reality as the ‘new Cold War’ and contemplated what lessons the decades-long conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union might offer to help improve our understanding of current great power rivalries. Since the West won the old Cold War, scholars have discussed the strategies that led to this outcome and whether they could be used again to defeat contemporary rivals.
While such a debate might be useful from an American perspective, it is, however, doubtful whether insights from such an analysis are still relevant for Europeans confronted with the double challenge of an increasingly aggressive Russia and Donald Trump’s return to power. In the first year of his second term, Trump and members of his administration have not only demanded that Europeans increase their defence spending, at times they have also seemed willing to sacrifice Ukraine for a rapprochement with Russia, repeatedly talked about seizing Greenland, which is part of an EU and NATO member state, and consistently shown a hostile attitude toward Europe’s liberal democracies while openly supporting the continent’s far-right parties.
Back to the age of empires?
There is no doubt that the nature of the transatlantic relationship and Europe’s global position has changed profoundly in recent times. Accordingly, observers comparing current American policy towards Europe with the days of the old Cold War tend to highlight the differences, pointing out that during the Cold War the defence of Europe was a top priority in Washington and that the United States profited from investing in strong alliances worldwide. The present state of affairs, however, is likened to past ages of great power politics and imperialism. Some warn of a ‘return of spheres of influence’ and point to similarities between the present-day situation and the 1945 Yalta Conference, when the ‘Big Three’—the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union—agreed on the division of Europe. Others refer to a ‘scramble for Europe’, alluding to the efforts of larger powers to ‘divide and rule’ the continent, thereby evoking associations with the age of imperialism, when European powers ruled large parts of the world and quarrelled over territory and influence during the ‘scramble for Africa’.
While such descriptions are an interesting reflection of Europe’s new sense of vulnerability (or the schadenfreude of observers with little sympathy for Europe), they hardly help to analyse present-day international affairs. Despite its many weaknesses, Europe is in a much better position now than it was as a war-torn continent in 1945. And the Big Three at the Yalta Conference were members of a war coalition, with Washington and London still anxious to continue the cooperation with the Soviet Union after the defeat of their common enemy Nazi Germany, while at the same time hoping to protect the rights of the Eastern Europeans under Soviet occupation, at least to some extent. Nor can Europe’s situation be compared with that of Africa as it came under colonial rule during the ‘scramble’ of the 1880s and the 1890s. Admittedly, the ambitions of today’s great powers’ leaders in many ways resemble the imperialist thinking of late 19th century international politics. Yet back then, despite all great power rivalries, there was an underlying consensus to uphold the supremacy of the imperial powers and keep Africans in a subordinate position. With the outbreak of colonial wars, it became taboo to openly side with the challengers of imperial rule and support rebellions or anti-imperialist activities against European competitors.
The Global South’s Past, Europe’s Future
This changed during the Cold War, when the two superpowers openly sympathised with insurgencies that challenged the geopolitical influence of the other. Most famously, Moscow supplied arms to America’s enemy during the Vietnam War, while Washington did the same for the Mujahideen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. Overall, during the numerous ‘hot wars’ that plagued the Third World during the Cold War, each superpower regularly supported one side or the other. Looking at present-day crises, the situation is much closer to the Cold War than to the age of imperialism, with external powers often interfering and actively supporting one of the parties involved with the aim of increasing their own influence in the conflict region.
Yet Cold War analogies are usually absent in the debate about Europe’s new geopolitical position. One exception is an article by former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, Bilahari Kausikan, arguing that ‘Trump’s “America first” approach echoes the strategy Washington has used toward much of Asia for more than five decades’, pointing to continuities in American policy since the announcement of the so-called Nixon Doctrine. Concluding, Kausikan counsels Europeans to ‘learn to deal with Washington not as a superpower with almost unlimited willingness to defend them but as an offshore balancer that will use its forces discriminatingly to advance American interests first’.
Indeed, also pertaining to Europe, the patterns of the Cold War still help us understand present-day great power rivalries. However, for this region, the frame of reference can no longer be the history of (Western) Europe during the Cold War. Instead, to better understand Europe’s current situation and potential future, it is necessary to look beyond Europe’s borders and study the Cold War history of Africa and Asia. Since Odd Arne Westad’s seminal work ‘The Global Cold War’ (2005), numerous historical studies have deepened our understanding of how the Cold War impacted the regions then referred to as the ‘Third World’. Conflicts there often did not follow the bipolar logic of U.S.–Soviet antagonism but rather had local roots dating back to colonial times, and the superpowers could influence, though rarely determine their course and outcome.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union and the United States were generally not the only external powers to interfere in Third World crises. The (former) colonial powers often pursued goals that were not in line with U.S. strategy when trying to preserve some of their global influence. Most notoriously, France was especially keen to preserve its status as a great power independent of the United States. And the socialist camp, too, was by no means a monolithic bloc once China began to compete for leadership in the Communist world after the Sino-Soviet split around 1960. Moreover, in the wake of decolonisation, many of the newly independent countries joined ranks in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), advancing their vision of a just world order.
In many ways, the Cold War in Africa and Asia was not dramatically different from the great power rivalries we are seeing today in a seemingly more complex, ‘multipolar’ world. Then as now, international affairs are shaped by two preeminent superpowers—Beijing having replaced Moscow as Washington’s main rival—competing for global influence, several great and middle powers asserting their right to have a say in world affairs, as well as groups of medium-sized and small states working together to defend their interests.
Dealing with great powers
Now, however, Europe’s position has changed substantially, its difficulties interestingly resembling the challenges African and Asian states had to deal with after the end of colonial rule. While having achieved formal independence, these countries were in a very fragile position, confronted with the risks posed by U.S.–Soviet rivalry and threats from several great and middle powers. In Africa, the postcolonial states faced the hostile intentions of (former) colonial powers and the white minority regimes in the south of the continent. During the Congo Crisis (1960–1963), for example, Belgium and the white minority regimes supported the secessionist province of Katanga, endangering the territorial integrity of the new state almost immediately after its independence. At the same time, both superpowers meddled in the Congo’s internal conflicts to shape the outcome of the crisis in their favour. In Asia, many states worried about aggression and subversion by the People’s Republic of China, a great power in its own right since the Sino-Soviet split. Nowadays, Europeans are having to learn to survive in a world shaped by the superpower conflict between the USA and China, with another aggressive great power—Russia—just next door.
During the Cold War, many Afro-Asian countries aimed to safeguard their sovereignty and territorial integrity by pursuing a policy of non-alignment, enabling them to cultivate relations with both superpowers. That said, non-aligned states usually still showed a tilt to the East or the West and cooperated with a superpower or their former colonial ruler in security questions. And even states that were in a formal alliance with one superpower often maintained some freedom of manoeuvre and cultivated pragmatic relations with all relevant actors in their neighbourhood. For them, alliances were a tool to pursue their national interests in a regional context, not a deliberate choice for one side or another in a global ideological conflict.
Similarly, no matter whether NATO continues to exist or not, Europeans are unlikely to view the world from the perspective of a unified West anymore. Certainly, as long as they need the United States’ help in the Ukraine War, they will applaud speeches as the one Secretary of State Marco Rubio has recently given at the Munich Security Conference the same way many African and Asian politicians paid lip service to the anticommunist rhetoric of the Cold War. But they will hardly buy into the idea of a common ‘Western civilisation’ that needs to be revived under US leadership. Instead, they will likely approach their relations with larger powers from a more transactional point of view. In this regard, it will be interesting to see whether Europe seeks either to reestablish pragmatic relations with Russia or to isolate it, as Africans did for decades with Apartheid South Africa during the Cold War.
Coalition building
After the fall of European empires, the newly independent states aimed to implement their foreign policy strategies through the creation of new organisations and networks to foster Afro-Asian solidarity. Most postcolonial countries became members of the NAM and cooperated in the United Nations (UN) to advance their interests and ideas of a fairer world order. They also founded regional organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to solve the problems in their neighbourhood without superpower interference.
While present-day Europe is at the forefront of regional integration, the reluctance of many countries in the Global South to side with Europe in the Ukraine War indicates that Europe’s success in making its case on the global stage is limited at best. Nonetheless, the European Union (EU) and several European countries have recently made efforts to forge stronger links with select countries in the Global South. The current debate revolves around the need to build coalitions with other ‘middle powers’, such as India and Brazil. It remains to be seen what impact the loosening of transatlantic bonds will have on cooperation between European countries and those in the Global South.
Upholding international norms
Such cooperation could revolve around joint advocacy for shared norms. During the Cold War, Afro-Asian countries had built networks and organisations to jointly promote certain international norms, and such endeavours were effective at a time when both Washington and Moscow had wooed the newly independent countries in their competition for influence and prestige in the Third World. In this context, Afro-Asian states succeeded in their attempts to delegitimize European colonial rule on the UN stage and to consolidate an international system based on the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all states (but failed in their struggle for a more just global economic order).
Considering Trump’s hostility toward international organisations and international law, using the UN to uphold international norms does not seem a very promising approach. Beijing’s strategy of continuously building up its presence in international organisations, however, could provide incentives for Washington not to leave this territory to China and become more actively involved in the UN again. Moreover, a Sino-American competition for prestige on the international stage could provide opportunities for small and medium-sized countries from Europe and the Global South to use this forum to promote an international order in which the great powers respect the rights of weaker states to some degree.
Policy recommendation 1: Accepting reality
In response to the new direction of U.S. foreign policy, European leaders have called for closer cooperation between their governments and an increase in defence spending, with the aim of reducing Europe’s reliance on Washington. There is now widespread acceptance that Europe needs to adapt to a world in which great powers ruthlessly pursue their own interests. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz recently stated that Europe must ‘learn to speak the language of power politics’. However, the fact that European leaders spent the last year trying to appease Trump shows that they are not quite there yet. Moreover, it is doubtful that Europe will be able to speak ‘the language of power politics’ in the same way as Washington, Beijing or Moscow in the foreseeable future.
There are certainly good reasons to increase defence spending and to cooperate more closely within the EU on foreign and security policy. In this context, London’s willingness to improve relations with the EU again and play a leading role in the ‘coalition of the willing’ supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression has strengthened the continent. Nevertheless, the EU remains a union of sovereign states, lacking the cohesion of a unified nation state. And as desirable as cooperation with non-EU European states is, it further limits Europe’s capacity to pursue its interests in a manner comparable to that of the great powers.
Europe’s best option right now is to accept that it has lost its privileged position within the international system. European empires once ruled the world. During the Cold War, Europe enjoyed peace and stability that other world regions did not experience due to the legacy of colonialism and superpower interference that fuelled regional conflicts. At least the western part of the continent enjoyed more freedom and prosperity than ever before in its history. After 1989/1991, European countries fared well as junior partners of the United States during decades of unchallenged American hegemony.
The governments of Europe now have to adapt to a much more fragile and vulnerable position. This includes continued cooperation with Washington on questions of European security. During the Cold War, newly independent countries in Africa and Asia also worked with their former colonial rulers or one of the superpowers on security matters, while gradually increasing their freedom of action in international affairs. Reducing Europe’s reliance on the United States is an important mid- to long-term goal. However, cutting all ties with Washington prematurely would only harm Ukraine and encourage Russia to further pursue its imperialist ambitions in Eastern Europe.
Policy recommendation 2: Forging coalitions of medium-sized and small states
Nonetheless, it cannot be in Europe’s interest to actively support an American agenda that openly disregards international law and is based on the belief that, to quote the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy, the ‘outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations’. Europe is a continent of medium-sized and small states, and its relative influence in global affairs is declining. In a world based on the privileges of great powers instead of the rights of sovereign states, it would be on the losing side. The willingness of many European leaders to bend over backwards to justify breaches of international law by the United States, as long as they do not occur in Europe, contributes to the erosion of the rules and norms on which European security depends. Accordingly, European leaders should be cautious not to show too much enthusiasm for the idea of Western civilisation championed by Rubio during the Munich Security Conference. To be identified with a concept of the West that glorifies imperial expansion and demonises anticolonial liberation struggles in Africa and Asia will hardly help Europe to find new partners in the Global South.
European leaders are seeking to forge closer ties with countries from the Global South for good reason, as a balancing strategy against outsized American or Chinese influence. However, it is questionable whether the current focus on middle powers is the best course of action. A world in which a few great powers are joined by several middle powers that also claim a say in international affairs would not be safer or more stable than a world shaped solely by great power rivalries. An agenda that focuses solely on middle powers misses the opportunity to build more inclusive coalitions with all medium-sized and small states that are concerned about the resurgence of great power politics and the erosion of the rules-based order.
In this regard, European policymakers could learn from the Third World’s strategy during the Cold War, which emphasised building an international order based on equal rights for all states, big and small alike. Membership of organisations such as NAM did not depend on a state’s size or power, but rather on its willingness to subscribe to specific ideas and positions. Adopting such a model could enable Europe to turn its lack of great power status to its advantage. As a group of small and medium-sized countries, Europe could appeal to the shared interests of small and medium-sized countries worldwide in upholding basic international norms, such as the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states. By doing so, Europe could help keep alive the idea of a world order that is not based on ‘spheres of influence’ and great power hegemony.
Policy recommendation 3: Encouraging the right kind of superpower competition
To achieve this goal, Europe should welcome China’s growing engagement with the United Nations. This does not mean taking Chinese rhetoric about its commitment to ‘revitalize the United Nations system’ at face value. But active Chinese participation in international organisations could benefit Europe, not least because it might incentivise Washington to turn its attention to the UN again.
The Cold War competition for prestige on the UN stage was not without advantage for the rest of the world. In their desire to win over the Third World, both Moscow and Washington eventually came to support the anticolonial agenda that Afro-Asian states advanced in the General Assembly. At times, concern for one’s reputation even provided incentives for superpower cooperation, such as when the United States and the Soviet Union worked together in the global campaign to eradicate small pox. In many ways, the UN became a forum in which postcolonial states could, through the sheer size of their number, make their voice heard and at times influence the policies of the superpowers.
Therefore, any attempt to increase the relevance of the UN again would be in Europe’s interest. A superpower rivalry that is played out in international organisations is preferable to one that unfolds through superpower interference in regional crises and conflicts. Of course, this is easier said than done. (While I am writing this paragraph, the United States and Israel have just started attacking Iran again.) Regarding the Ukraine War, there are good reasons for keeping the United States involved in order to ward off Russia’s aggression, even though the current administration’s motives and designs do not always align with European interests. Similarly, during the Ogaden War (1977–78), even pro-Western African states did not condemn the military aid provided by the Soviet Union and Cuba to Addis Ababa after Somalia launched a full-scale invasion with the aim of annexing Ethiopian territory. Despite all the rhetoric about ‘African solutions to African problems’, Soviet interference seemed preferable to a breach of the principle of the inviolability of postcolonial borders—a norm that the OAU firmly upheld.
In any case, crisis prevention and the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Europe and its neighbourhood take on new significance at a time when hostile external powers are willing to exploit any opportunity to increase their influence in the region. Furthermore, European leaders would be ill-advised to infer from contemporary analyses that, in order to have a seat at the table in a new era of ‘might makes right’ after the ‘return of great power rivalry’, Europe needs to become militarily involved in conflicts around the world. During the Cold War, the involvement of external powers regularly fuelled international tensions and prolonged the numerous conflicts that plagued the Third World, with devastating consequences for the affected regions. And for the interfering powers, more often than not, in the mid- and long-term the costs of intervention far outweighed any short-term gains.
