HM Treasury series 6: treaty negotiations, 2017
The 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty
21 February 2017
Lord Bew of Donegore in the County of Antrim
Professor of Irish Politics, Queen’s University of Belfast
This talk dealt with the fundamental problems at the heart of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 where even now there are some unresolved ambiguities. The economic provisions required substantial further elaboration in the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1925.
Formerly a historical adviser to the Bloody Sunday Tribunals, Lord Bew is a crossbench peer who is also Chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life and a visiting Professor in the Department of History at King's College London. He previously served on the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, and has also served on the Joint Committee on the Defamation Bill. He was appointed as a non-party-political peer by the independent House of Lords Appointments Commission in February 2007, following his contributions to the Good Friday Agreement.
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty
31 March 2017
Sir Nigel Wicks and Sir Stephen Wall
Sir Nigel Wicks was Second Permanent Secretary (Finance), HM Treasury between 1989 and 2000. Sir Stephen Wall was Private Secretary to Prime Minister John Major between 1991 and 1993 and is the author of The Official History of Britain and the European Community.
The speakers reflected on the challenging negotiations leading up to the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) signed in February 1992 from their unique vantage points within HM Treasury and No. 10 Downing St.
Britain’s negotiations to join the EEC in the 1960s
12 April 2017
Dr David Thackeray
Senior Lecturer, University of Exeter
As Britain prepares to leave the European Union it was useful to reflect on the country's first two unsuccessful applications to join the EEC (in 1961 and 1967). In particular, this paper considered the challenges that Britain faced in reconciling its plans for membership with its wider relations with EFTA and the Commonwealth. During the 1960s, successive governments were largely successful in presenting EEC membership as compatible with Britain's wider global trade relationships and the policy attracted widespread support. In part, this resulted from the government's ability to cast the debate on Europe in terms of moral/strategic language rather than that of consumer or producer utility.