Trump 2.0 and the US-UK Special Relationship: A Role still for History and Memory in the Diplomatic Strategy?

Sam Edwards, Loughborough University | 20 November 2024

The result of the US election has met with engaged discussion across European capitals as America’s allies assess the likely implications of a second Trump administration and ponder how best to deal with the famously mercurial president-elect.

In London, such questions have been especially pressing. Brexit has left the UK relatively isolated in Europe, UK economic growth remains fragile, and the president-elect has already put the British Government on notice that the ‘special relationship’ – a phrase popularised by Winston Churchill during his speech at Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946 – provides no guarantee of future presidential favour. See, for instance, the formal complaint lodged by the Trump campaign team with the Federal Election Commission accusing the UK Labour Party of ‘foreign interference’. See, too, the provocative comments of incoming Vice-President JD Vance that Britain was on track to become the first “truly Islamist country that will get a nuclear weapon”.

In this challenging diplomatic context, the initial moves by Downing Street have been effective. Thanks to the adept work of Ambassador Dame Karen Pierce’s team at the British Embassy in Washington, Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer was commendably quick to congratulate the president-elect after his election victory, and behind the scenes Foreign Secretary David Lammy has skilfully built relationships with key figures in the Republican Party.

But what of the broader diplomatic strategy? The long history of the ‘special relationship’ offers some useful guidance for Starmer’s team as they develop their plans for engaging with the incoming Trump administration.

Memory Diplomacy

A well-documented feature of the president-elect’s character concerns his approach to the ‘business’ of foreign relations: he is transactional and not persuaded, at least so we’re told, by appeals to sentiment. Given that for the last eighty years successive British governments have frequently placed an emotive appeal to sentiment at the very centre of their US-focused diplomacy this clearly presents a significant obstacle.

Yet while Trump will likely remain transactional in his diplomatic dealings we should be wary of dismissing outright the potential value (and effect) of a ‘Churchillian’ approach to the White House, especially given recent reports that Trump intends to return to the Oval Office the bust of Churchill removed by his predecessor. Put another way, if flowery rhetoric won’t be enough to win Trump’s favour the use of ritual, royalty, and historical memory may still pay some dividends. After all, such ‘memory diplomacy’ – activities which invoke the past in the service of the present – was deployed with some success during Trump’s 2019 State Visit to Britain, which included a meeting with the Queen at Buckingham Palace. Downing Street is thus fortunate that two invaluable opportunities for memory diplomacy loom just over the horizon.

The first is next year, which sees the 80^th anniversaries of the end of World War II, an event which continues to have significant traction in American popular memory. In light of the on-going Russian invasion of Ukraine, the anniversary of VE Day (8 May) is especially ripe for evocative symbolism and one that British diplomacy might usefully exploit given Trump’s nomination for Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, a man friendly to NATO.

The other upcoming anniversary to which British diplomacy might pay heed is in July 2026, the 250^th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. Although this is not perhaps the most obvious occasion to celebrate US-UK connections – July 4^th 1776 initiated the formal separation of the American colonies from Britain – there is in fact ample precedence for its careful ‘use’ by British diplomats.  During the Bicentennial of 1976, for instance, the British government gifted to Washington a copy of Magna Carta, the document often identified as an inspiration to the American Constitution. The underlying message was clear: the Revolution of the late 18^th century was a mere momentary family squabble in a far longer history of common values that ultimately reached back to the watermeadows at Runnymede.

Real Estate

Carefully choreographed memory diplomacy invoking the Churchillian ‘ties that bind’ will thus retain at least some utility to Starmer’s government, particularly given Trump’s own connections to the UK. He is the first president since Woodrow Wilson to have a British mother and he has a well-known affinity for her birthplace, Scotland, where he owns a Golf course.

Nonetheless, Trump’s personal investment in the ‘special relationship’ will be limited at best and he will no doubt measure Britain against simple criteria: is it useful to him, and to his broader agenda? In seeking an answer to this question he will likely be characteristically direct, but beyond that his underlying approach to ‘dealing’ with Britain will not be especially unusual, and several previous American presidents have similarly paid little more than lip service to the idea of a ‘special relationship’. Simply put, while there will be a difference in ‘how’ Trump talks to Britain it will be of tone, but not necessarily of tenor.

For Starmer, the response is reasonably straight-forward: embrace the oft-quoted statement of Lord Palmerstone that only ‘interests’, not allies, are eternal, and then assert Britain’s continued strategic utility to the United States. Perhaps a gentle reminder would not go amiss that from RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire (which recently welcomed American B-52 bombers) to Ascension Island deep in the South Atlantic, British-owned real estate underpins American global supremacy. This at least appears to be something not entirely lost on the president-elect – in a recent phone call Trump is reported to have pointedly remind Putin that the United States retains a powerful military presence in Europe (though the Kremlin denies any such call occurred).  And then there is the relationship between the US and UK intelligence agencies, now so interdependent that to sever the connection would be to the detriment of US national security.

Play the Long Game

The broader objective for the British government will be to develop a long-term diplomatic strategy which accepts the enduring presence – at least for the foreseeable future – of Trumpism. Two ideas may usefully inform any such strategy and in doing so help Prime Minister Starmer and Foreign Secretary Lammy (and their successors) negotiate the challenges that this future presents.

First, now is the time for British foreign policy to pivot towards allies in Europe. Strengthening the post-Brexit relationship with Paris, Rome, Berlin, and Warsaw, especially around enhancing the Continent’s defence industrial base, is essential to ensuring that Europe can offer a credible deterrent to Putin’s Russia, not to mention provide on-going support to Ukraine. In this regard, the optics of Starmer’s recent visit to Paris – where he attended the Armistice Day commemorations with President Macron – are to be welcomed.

Of course, any pivot to Europe will need to be handled carefully so as not to anger or alarm Washington, and to aid it in this endeavour the current British government might usefully look for guidance to the premierships of Harold Macmillan (1957-63) and that of Harold Wilson (1964-70). Faced with his own significant challenge to US-UK relations – restoring transatlantic trust after the Suez Crisis of 1956 – Macmillan successfully cultivated a close rapport with President Eisenhower and, later, President Kennedy, and he did so whilst also improving British relations with Europe (though his plan to secure EEC membership was ultimately thwarted by President Charles de Gaulle of France). Wilson adopted a similar path, itself a not insignificant feat given that he simultaneously resisted persistent US pressure to send British troops to Vietnam and had to confront profound economic challenges (including the 1967 devaluation of the pound).  In short, if Starmer wishes to navigate a careful line between the United States and Europe then the successes (and failures) of his predecessors in the 1960s – when Britain was similarly ‘of’ Europe, but not in it – may offer some useful food for thought.

Second, now is also the time to play the long game and look beyond the next four years (assuming, of course, that the 22^nd Amendment is not repealed). Given that most of those appointed to positions of leadership during the president-elect’s first term subsequently fell from favour identifying a potential successor from among the new crop of Trump nominees is difficult. His cult of personality accentuates this still further. At this stage, though, the obvious candidate for future Republican leadership is JD Vance, the incoming Vice-President. And given Vance’s vocal pride in his Scots-Irish ancestry those currently pondering who best to appoint as the next UK Ambassador in Washington (should Dame Pierce be replaced) might do well to look to Ulster for potential candidates rather than – as appears the case at present – to the shortlist for the Chancellorship of Oxford University.

These are most certainly ‘interesting times’ for US-UK relations. But current British leaders can take some reassurance from the fact that they are not the first to face significant challenges in their relationship with Washington. Moreover, whilst the president-elect’s ‘style’ will be uniquely his own many of his administration’s likely priorities – especially countering China and demanding that European allies ‘step up’ – will be no surprise and might be expected from any incoming occupant of the Oval Office, Republican or Democrat.   

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About the author

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Dr Sam Edwards is Reader (Assoc. Prof) in Modern Political History at Loughborough University. A former Fulbright Scholar and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, Sam is a historian of war, memory, and of US-UK relations. His book – Allies in Memory: World War II and the Politics of Transatlantic Commemoration, c.1941-2001 (Cambridge, 2015) – was shortlisted for the Royal Historical Society’s Gladstone Prize, and he has previously provided expert insights on US-UK relations for BBC News, BBC Radio, CNN, US Government TV, The Washington Post, and The Independent. The views expressed here are his own.