Syria: A Troubled Past and an Uncertain Future

Roger Higginson | 14 December 2024

The traumas and horrors of the Hamas attack on Israel, its brutal retribution and subsequent expansion into Lebanon has now been followed by the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. As a result the media spotlight has moved from Gaza to Damascus via Beirut, but what do we need to know about this former piece of the Ottoman and French empires?

Historically, Syria is part of the cradle of civilisation and in more recent centuries became part of the Ottoman empire. Following the end of World War I it became part of the French mandate in 1922 against which it rose up in revolt three years later. A further revolt led by Islamic populists in 1944 ultimately led to independence in 1946.

This was not however the herald of peace and stability. A series of army inspired political coups eventually led to the rise to power of the Assad family in 1970. What became a dynasty had its origins in Syria's north-west Mediterranean coast, the country's Alawite heartland. Coming from a minority within the minority Shia Muslim community the Assads tended to rely on the military and the secret police to maintain order. These were used to brutal effect during the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 when Bashar Assad sent tanks into Hama, a centre of the rebellion against his government.

The Arab Spring revolts led to a civil war in Syria which continued until Assad’s downfall in December 2024. During those years the situation in the country steadily degraded, with growing interference by external players such as Russia and Turkey, the involvement of the Kurds in the north east, and the rise and fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As a result, the humanitarian situation for the people living in this devastated country was described in March 2024 as “thirteen years of unprecedented devastation and displacement”  coupled with “gross and systematic violations and breaches of international law.” Half the population suffers from hunger, and a similar proportion have been displaced, either inside the country or beyond.  

As a result, the prospects for the country would be bleak even if it were at peace, with no external interference from outside its borders. The opposite however is the case. In the north west, Sunni Arab militias supported by Turkey have taken control of territory close to the border that acts as a barrier against the Kurds. From the north, the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) radical Islamist opposition has moved south to take control of Damascus, while a coalition of US-backed Kurdish militias (also termed  Syrian Democratic Forces) control the north-eastern region, together with its oil fields. At the opposite end of the country in the south west, Israel has carved out a chunk of territory beyond the Golan heights, and has been bombing not only the chemical weapons facilities of the former Assad regime but also the conventional weapons of its military. Syria is consequently defenceless apart from the weapons held by its various regional militias.

Where then does this awful situation leave Assad’s two key supporters when he was in power, namely Iran and Russia? Both have their complexities, but Russia’s relationship tended to be more transactional. One of the attractions of Syria from a Russian perspective is its Mediterranean coastline between Lebanon and Turkey, and by leasing the naval facilities at Tartus it has gained access to a Mediterranean port for its navy. Current indications are that this contract may continue under the new administration in Damascus. Apart from that, the military experience gained by Russia since its interventions from 2015 onwards has helped in the reform and modernisation of its military and acted as a showcase for sales of military equipment.  From that perspective, and contrary to the opinions expressed in many western media the fall of the Assad regime has not been a significant loss for Russia.

In a sense, the same holds true for Iran, as, like Russia, it did not actively fight to keep Assad in power, and so did not lose out when he fled. But unlike Russia it does not have a naval base in Syria, or military experience in the country to showcase. Many commentators consider that its main reason for supporting Assad was logistic: to enable supply lines to Hezbollah in Lebanon. As the new government is hostile to the Shia, these lines will be lost. It remains to be seen whether effective alternatives can be found, so Iran may well lose out. Of course, it is also the case that a now defenceless Syrian state is facing armed regional militias. If they cannot all voluntarily agree to a modus vivendi, everybody could lose out.

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About the author

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Roger Higginson is a Ph.D. graduate from Sussex University on the early years of the British Mandate in Palestine: and former Government official representing the UK in a range of international organisations.  He is also a former board member of the Council for Arab-British Understanding (CAABU) and has recently been granted Research Associate status at Sussex University.  He periodically submits evidence on the Middle East to the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee.