Cameron’s veto: a calamitous break with the past?
Helen Parr |
In 1960, the Conservative Chancellor Derek Heathcoat-Amory remarked that a British decision to seek membership of the European Economic Community was a 'political act, with economic consequences'. It was a prescient judgement: his observation has been the basis of Britain's relationship with the European Community/Union ever since. By refusing to participate in a new Treaty to solve the Eurozone crisis, David Cameron broke with this simple fact.
Political discussion of Britain's relationship with the EU is dominated by two ideas. The first is that there has always been a distinct cleavage between two level camps in British politics: the 'pro' and the 'anti' Europeans. The second is that there is a long heritage of British awkwardness about full participation in Europe. Neither view is completely accurate. Rather, a muted core of reluctant support lies at the mainstream of Britain's relationship with the EC/EU. As the veteran Brussels weather-watcher Sir Con O'Neill put it in the early 1970s, Britain has to participate, because 'staying out is worse'.
Of course, politicians hold deep and passionate views about how Britain should engage with the EU. Naturally also, attitudes towards integration in Britain are of a different nature to those in France or Germany. However, since the 1960s the governing consensus in Britain has been consistent. Britain should encourage the European project to develop; and Britain's influence in Europe, Washington and globally depends upon participation in it.
Even in the first post war decade, Britain's policy towards European integration was not so much reluctant as pragmatic. Politicians did underestimate the political significance of nascent integration, but the Attlee, Churchill and Eden governments deliberated at length before deciding against involvement in the European Coal and Steel Community and the EEC. Britain's economic interests were too global to join, but successive governments wanted the Europeans to succeed. They knew only too well the damage inflicted by instability on the continent.
By 1959, the EEC's political potential was evident. Macmillan realised Britain had no alternative but to accede. In 1967, Harold Wilson's Cabinet accepted there was no destination other than Europe if Britain wished to remain a power with political clout and international reach. The only way to influence in Washington was 'through Brussels'. Staying out would condemn Britain to dwindle rapidly to the status of a 'Greater Sweden' (they aimed higher than Switzerland in those days).
The wave of discontent on the left about Britain's membership in the 1970s was not just the inevitable assertion of hostility once membership was assured. It was a reaction to the governing consensus: an expression of disappointment with Labour's achievements in office and a struggle for the soul of British socialism. Opposition to membership of the EEC was one part of this.
No doubt Tony Benn (anti) or Shirley Williams (pro) genuinely believed in consulting the British people, but Labour' s decision to hold a referendum in 1975 reflected a battle about where power should lie within the British political system. Was it with the Labour leadership, the Party conference, Parliament or the people? The voice of the electorate was a powerful weapon to draw on in this fight for control of the Party.
When the referendum did come, voters overwhelmingly endorsed Wilson's recommendation. It was in Britain's interests to stay in the European Community, only few were terribly excited about it. Britain could not, as some pro Europeans hoped, reposition itself like France. It could not adopt 'Europe' as the new central expression of Britain's power.
Under Thatcher, Britain became increasingly entangled with the EC, as Thatcher pushed the single market. Thatcher's skill was to place Britain at the centre of European developments, while emphasising British exceptionalism. It was 'our money' and we had to win it 'back'. Even the Bruges speech, where she decried the advance of Euro-socialism, did not change Britain's policy. When the tone of Thatcher's attitude towards Europe ranged towards dislike, her position as national leader was imperilled.
Despite the set-back of Britain's withdrawal from the Exchange Rate Mechanism, Major continued the consensus. On return from negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, he declared a British victory, 'game, set and match'. With this, he continued the advancement of Britain's connection with the EC, alongside the rhetoric of singular influence.
Like Labour's contortions in the 1970s, Conservative opposition to Britain's membership was a reaction to changes in the governing centre. MPs responded to the end of the Thatcher period by fighting over her heritage. The abstract ideal of national sovereignty was more important to those whose views were marginalised. If only they could control party policy, they could execute their preferences.
Major rode out the opposition, gaining ratification for Maastricht. He avoided a 'two-speed' Europe, allowing it to be known that Britain could eventually 'opt-in' to the single currency. Blair spoke of a more enthusiastic urge to place Britain 'at the heart' of Europe, and could do this while remaining outside the euro.
Cameron's veto ended this consistent acquiescence to the necessity of engagement. He secured no safeguards for Britain. Britain's influence is fatally compromised as the 26 move towards a deepening fiscal and political union in an attempt to solve the worst economic crisis since the 1930s. Britain's hesitancy also adds to doubt as to whether the EU can overcome its problems: failure to do so will be disastrous for Europe and for Britain.
Cameron prioritised party political interests ahead of national ones. As business leaders, financiers, Cabinet ministers, the devolved authorities and MPs question his judgement, it is clear that he failed to understand the basic force of Heathcoat-Amory's comment. The language of Euro-scepticism is not the heart of political opinion of Britain's role in Europe. Britain cannot be anything other than a committed European power: Cameron's veto presages a calamitous break with the past.
Please note: Views expressed are those of the author.About the author
